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## ANNEXES

- **Annex 1**  
  Overview of Desired Procurement Capacities

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### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>Agriculture Extension Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPS</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Programme Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPTU</td>
<td>Central Procurement Technical Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Development Project Proforma</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoB</td>
<td>Government of Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMED</td>
<td>Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGI-CBP</td>
<td>Local Government Institutions Capacity Building Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Project Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Procuring Entity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPA</td>
<td>Public Procurement Act</td>
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<td>PPR</td>
<td>Draft Public Procurement Rules</td>
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<td>PPRP</td>
<td>Public Procurement Reform Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>Policy Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDE</td>
<td>Royal Danish Embassy in Dhaka</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRMAC</td>
<td>Rural Roads and Market Access Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Tender Evaluation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>Tender Opening Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSUN</td>
<td>Regional Fisheries and Livestock Development Component, Technical Support Unit Noakhali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Union Parishad</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSSPS</td>
<td>Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Programme Support</td>
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</tbody>
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1. INTRODUCTION

In line with the principles of the Paris Declaration, the Royal Danish Embassy in Dhaka (RDE) has initiated a gradual process to align Danish support with the national systems of the Government of Bangladesh (GoB), including the public procurement system.

To support the alignment process, Rambøll Management Consulting has been requested to undertake an assessment of procurement capacities in six selected programme components in two Danish sector programmes: the Agriculture Sector Programme Support (ASPS) and the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Programme Support (WSSPS).\(^1\)

The immediate objectives of the assessment are to:

- Determine whether sufficient procurement capacities exist within the Danish sector programmes to fully align the procurements carried out under the Danish sector programmes with the GoB system.
- To the extent that capacity gaps prevent full alignment, prepare a procurement capacity development plan which can address the identified gaps and prepare the Danish sector programmes for full alignment.

This report summarises the findings of the procurement capacity assessment and makes recommendations for how the most imminent gaps can be addressed in the short term. For the more demanding capacity gaps identified, a detailed, longer-term Procurement Capacity Development Plan will be developed, and the present report sets out guidelines for this task.

The report is structured as follows:

In chapter 2, the procurement system of Bangladesh, and the legal and institutional framework for executing procurements in the context of the Danish sector programmes, is introduced.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methodology applied for the assessment, including the underlying understanding of the concept of procurement capacity development and the approach taken to measuring procurement capacity in the context of Bangladesh.

The main findings of the assessment are presented in chapter 4, through focus on the capacity associated with the institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and accountability to carry out sound and efficient procurements in the Danish sector programmes.

Chapter 5, finally, summarises the findings and makes recommendations for how to address procurement capacity gaps.

\(^1\) The assessment was carried out by a mission to Dhaka in the period 18-29 April, 2009. The mission was comprised of Ms. Marie Louise Refsgaard (Team Leader), Ms. Rita Roos, Mr. Md. Mesbahuddin, Mr. Masud Akhter Khan and Ms. Camilla Skovbaech Pedersen (Rambøll Management Consulting), and Ms. Kirsten Ejlskov Jensen and Ms. Kerry Kassow (UNDP).
2. COUNTRY AND SECTOR PROGRAMME CONTEXT

In this chapter, the country and sector programme context for the procurement capacity assessment is introduced.

The chapter provides an overview of the public procurement system in Bangladesh, and the legal and institutional framework in place for executing procurements according to GoB procedures. It moreover describes the procurement practices applied for procurements within the Danish sector programme support to date.

2.1 The public procurement system in Bangladesh

Public procurement in Bangladesh is governed by the Public Procurement Act (PPA) of 2006\(^2\) and the Public Procurement Rules (PPR) of 2008\(^3\), which came into force January 31, 2008.

The new legislation addresses many of the deficiencies identified in earlier assessments of the public procurement system in Bangladesh\(^4\). Major legal and regulatory improvements include:

- A Central Procurement Technical Unit (CPTU) within the Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED) of the Ministry of Planning has been established as the normative/regulatory body for public procurement in Bangladesh.
- A review and appeals mechanisms has been established by law.
- Transparency provisions have been strengthened through new requirements to publish invitations for bids and contract award information.
- Accountability provisions have been strengthened by specifying processing and approving entities/authorities with respective timelines for different types and magnitude of procurement.
- Standard Bidding Documents for goods, works and services have been published.

The drafting of the new legal and regulatory framework was carried out in conjunction with a comprehensive World Bank-supported Public Procurement Reform Project (PPRP)\(^5\), though which a number of improvements to the institutional and management framework for procurement have also been achieved. These include development of a critical mass of 25 national procurement trainers, provision of training courses to more than 1700 public officials, and piloting of a centralized procurement information tracking system (MIS).

Despite these improvements, the public procurement system in Bangladesh still suffers from a number of major weaknesses. As no systematic assessment of the public procurement system in Bangladesh has been carried out since the introduction of the new legal and regulatory framework, no complete overview of these weaknesses is available. Nevertheless, the following deficiencies in the legal and institutional framework can be observed:

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\(^2\) Act No. 24 of 2006
\(^3\) S.R.O. No. 21-ACT/2008
\(^4\) Country Procurement Assessment Report Bangladesh (World Bank, 2002)
\(^5\) PPRP, Phase 1, 2002-2007, USD 4.5 mill.
The official English translation of the PPRA 2008 is still pending.
Standard Bidding Documents are provided in English language only, causing problems to small and medium enterprises particularly in rural areas.
Delegation of procurement decision making power as defined by the 'Delegation of Financial Power' results in highly centralised decision making processes for smaller procuring entities.
No procurement career system promoting professionalism in the procurement function exists.
No framework for procurement auditing is in place.
Interference, collusive practices, and corruption in public procurement are reportedly pervasive.

In addition to these challenges, the ongoing second phase of the PPRP also seeks to address the overall challenge of ensuring compliance with the PPA 2006 and PPR. Reportedly, non-compliance is widespread, in particular with regards to delays in contract awards, ineffective contract administration, and inappropriate bidding practices favouring collusion.

2.2 Procurement in the Danish sector programmes

In light of the limited knowledge and the perceived challenges of the newly introduced legal and institutional framework for public procurement, most development partners in Bangladesh today carry out procurements for donor funded programmes by use of donor rules.

This has also been the trend in the Danish agriculture and water/sanitation sector programmes, where Danida procedures have per default been followed and procurements predominantly been carried out by Crown Agents. As part of the Danish efforts to align its support to GoB systems, however, a gradual process to transfer programme procurements to GoB procurement procedures and phase out the use of Crown Agents has recently been initiated.

In the period July 1, 2008 to April 22, 2009, procurements for the six programme components reviewed for this procurement capacity assessment were carried out according to the following breakdown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector programme / component</th>
<th>Procurements carried out by the component</th>
<th>Procurements carried out by Crown Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of contracts (% of total no.)</td>
<td>Contract value in mill. taka (% of total value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Sector Programme Support II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>77 (73%)</td>
<td>25.3 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRMAC</td>
<td>99 (97%)</td>
<td>57.1 (82%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSUN</td>
<td>22 (96%)</td>
<td>2.8 (60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation Sector Programme Support II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>11 (85%)</td>
<td>37.6 (90%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGI-CBP</td>
<td>3 (43%)</td>
<td>1.6 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYSAWA Fund</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>623.2 (96%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated, an average of approximately 85% of all contracts is carried out independently by the components and predominantly using GoB procedures. The picture is, however, far from consistent. In one programme component under the WSSPS (LGI-CBP), 56% of the procurement volume processed in the period assessed has thus been outsourced to Crown Agents, while in an-

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6 In 2008, Bangladesh was ranked 147 out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2008).
7 PPRP, 2007-2010, USD 23.6 mill.
8 The information in the table is summarised based on data received from each of the six components reviewed. Data from different components may therefore not be fully comparable.
9 Procurements carried out independently by the programme components have predominantly been carried out using GoB procedures, though some programme components partly or fully appear to use Danida procedures, or a combination of different procedures.
10 For all procurements carried out by Crown Agents on behalf of the programme components, Danida procedures have been followed.
other component (HYSAWA Fund) under the same sector programme, as much as 96% of the procurement volume has been carried out by the programme and using GoB procedures.

The inconsistent level of alignment to GoB procedures and procurement setups is partly explained by the different alignment policies existing for each of the two sector programmes, though the individual experience and management support also appear to affect the choice of procurement strategy in the programme components.

Each of the six programme components are introduced in more detail below.

**2.2.2 Agriculture Sector Programme Support II**

From the ASPS, the following three programmes components are included in the procurement capacity assessment:

- Agricultural Extension Component (AEC)
- Rural Road Market Access Component (RRMAC)
- Regional Fisheries and Livestock Development Component, Technical Support Unit Noakhali (TSUN)

In October 2008, it was formally agreed with the Economic Relations Division of the Ministry of Finance that all components should seek to apply PPR 2008 to the extent feasible. It was concluded that if specific circumstances imply that the application of PPR 2008 would induce disadvantages for implementation of programme activities according to the agreed and approved work plans and budgets, Danida procedures should be applied\(^1\).

As illustrated by the table in section 2.2, the majority of all procurement transactions since July 2008 have been handled by the programme components. In AEC, GoB procedures are generally applied, with about one third of the procurement cases outsourced to Crown Agents. In RRMAC, the GoB procedures have been applied for the procurement of works, which accounts for the bulk of contracts issued. Contracts for procurement of goods are handed over to Crown Agents or processed by the project without following clearly defined rules. In TSUN, finally, GoB procedures are partly applied, while in some cases no clearly defined rules are applied.

**2.2.3 Water and Sanitation Sector Programme Support II**

The WSSPS components included in the procurement capacity assessment include:

- Sector Policy Support Component (PSU)
- Local Government Institutions Capacity Building Project (LGI-CBP)
- HYSAWA Fund Company

In contrast to the ASPS, the procurement strategy of the Danish WSSPS programme support is not only guided by the intentions communicated between RDE and the Economic Relations Division of the Ministry of Finance, but also more specifically by a Waiver List issued in March 2007 through a letter of the Cabinet Division and IMED through the Economic Relations Division.\(^2\) The letter exempts the procurement of certain specified goods and services under the WSSPS from application of GoB procedures. In other words, the WSSPS components have two procurement options: To use GoB procedures (in case of non-waiver items), or to use of Danida procedures (in case of waiver items).

As the table in section 2.2 illustrates, the Waiver List affects the procurement strategy of the different WSSPS components differently. In LGI-CBP, almost all required procurements are waived, thus leaving only procurement of minor goods below the established Crown Agents threshold\(^3\) to be carried out by the component. The same is the case for PSU, where consultancy services have

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\(^{1}\) Correspondance between Royal Danish Embassy and Ministry of Finance, Economic Relations Division, October 16, 2008.

\(^{2}\) WSSPS-II Accounting Manual, Appendix 33.

\(^{3}\) The thresholds for use of Crown Agents are listed in the WSSPS-II Accounting Manual, p. 32.
moreover not been waived and are therefore also procured by the component using GoB or Danida procedures. No waiver applies to the goods and services procured by the Union Parishads (UPs) for HYSAWA funds, for which the GoB procedures are applied.
3. ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

This chapter introduces the main methodological considerations shaping the procurement capacity assessment of the Danish agriculture and water/sanitation sector programmes in Bangladesh.

Following a brief overview of the broader procurement capacity development process and the role of the assessment in this framework, the chapter describes each of the key steps taken to identify the procurement capacity gaps presented later in this assessment report.

3.1 Overview of the procurement capacity development process

The procurement capacity assessment has been undertaken following the UNDP capacity development approach\(^\text{14}\) illustrated below.

As illustrated, the UNDP capacity development process consists of five steps, each containing a number of activities. This report summarises the findings of Step 2, which consists of three main activities:

1. Defining desired procurement capacities
2. Understanding actual procurement capacities
3. Establishing the 'capacity gap', i.e. the gap between desired and actual procurement capacities.

Each of these activities is described in the following sections.

\(^\text{14}\) UNDP Practice Note on Capacity Development (UNDP, October 2008)
3.2 Defining desired capacities

The identification of desired capacities is a cornerstone in any procurement capacity development process, as the desired procurement capacities provide the benchmark against which actual capacities can be measured and capacity gaps established.

In this capacity development process, the definition began in the scoping during Step 1 of the procurement capacity development process.15

During Step 1 it was agreed that the procurement capacity development process would choose the organisational level of the Danish sector programmes as point of entry, hereby addressing the vital organisational capacity challenges faced by the Danish sector programmes in their efforts to align their procurements with the GoB system. In contrast, limited attention would be given to assessing procurement capacities at the individual level (i.e. individual skills profiles) or at the level of the enabling environment (i.e. capacities associated with the broader legislative and institutional framework for procurement in Bangladesh).

It was also agreed that the capacity development process would mainly address capacity gaps relating to four core issues found to be of particular relevance to the sector programme context in Bangladesh: institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and accountability.

Finally, it was agreed that technical capacities to be addressed in the capacity development process would encompass each step in the entire procurement cycle, from procurement planning to payment of invoices.

In Step 2 of the capacity development process, this initial procurement capacity development framework provided the starting point for establishing specific desired capacities. For each step in the procurement cycle, a desired organisational capacity relating to institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and accountability was established, thus directly linking the chosen point of entry with the selected core issues and technical capacities.

The chart below illustrates the process of defining desired capacities for the technical capacity ‘procurement planning’:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional arrangements</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Desired capacity:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Desired capacity:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Desired capacity:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Desired capacity:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A well-defined recurring procedure is in place in the PE to ensure that annual procurement plans are prepared and approved on time</td>
<td>Head of PE actively encourages, participates in and approves procurement planning, and monitors the implementation of the plan</td>
<td>All staff involved in procurement is familiar with the procurement planning requirements set out in PPA 06 and PPA 08</td>
<td>Adequate action is taken if annual procurement plans are not developed, approved on time, or in accordance with legal requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means of verification:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Means of verification:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Means of verification:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Means of verification:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interview with PEs</td>
<td>• Interviews with Head of PE and project staff</td>
<td>• Evidence that sampled procurements are included in the procurement plan</td>
<td>• Interviews with PEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Approved procurement plan</td>
<td>• Publication on notice board and website</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Evidence of actions taken if annual procurement plans are not developed, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evidence that illegal splitting does not take place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the procurement cycle specific desired capacities, the assessment team also decided to define a number of generic capacities for each of the cross-cutting issues with a view to

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address those capacities at the organisational level which are independent of the specific steps in the procurement cycle, but yet must be in place to underpin alignment, such as the existence of incentives structures supporting good procurement performance, procurement auditing frameworks enabling corrective measures, and similar.

Both generic and procurement cycle-specific desired capacities were defined based on the requirements of the GoB procedures and, where these were found to include inadequate provisions, international best practice as defined by the OECD-DAC Methodology for Assessment of Public Procurement Systems.\textsuperscript{16}

An overview of all generic desired capacities can be viewed in Annex 1.

### 3.3 Understanding actual capacities

To understand the actual procurement capacity levels in the two Danish sector programmes, the assessment team visited each of the six selected programme components (cf. section 2.2) for 1-2 days, depending on the volume and complexity of procurement undertaken by the component.

For each component, a systematic assessment of the actual capacities against each of the defined desired capacities was made. Due to the lack of comprehensive procurement statistics in the two sector programmes assessed, the assessment of actual capacities followed a qualitative assessment approach, with interviews with personnel involved in programme procurements and strategically sampled procurement case reviews (3-5 procurements per components) constituting the main sources of evidence.

In addition to the component visits, interviews were also held with a number of other stakeholders relevant to the assessment. A full list of persons interviewed is included in Annex 2.

### 3.4 Establishing capacity gaps

Based on comparison between desired capacities and the actual capacities identified at the component level, capacity gaps for all generic and procurement cycle-specific capacities were established.

To provide easy overview of the capacity gaps identified, this report summarises the capacity gaps according to the four cross-cutting issues defined, across programme components and sector programmes. As the objective of the assessment is only secondarily to suggest capacity responses to the ongoing components and primarily to offer long-term capacity development responses for the Danish sector programme support, programme- and sector-specific findings are only highlighted to the extent that they divert from the overall trend or offer additional explanation to the capacity gap.

The findings of the procurement capacity assessment are presented in the next chapter.

4. **ASSESSMENT FINDINGS**

In this chapter, the overall findings of the procurement capacity assessment are presented according to the four main core issues identified in the scoping phase, i.e. institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and accountability.

4.1 **Institutional arrangements**

A well structured and operational institutional framework for public procurement in the agriculture and water/sanitation sectors in Bangladesh is a key prerequisite for successful alignment of the Danish sector programme support with the national procurement system.

This section addresses four aspects of institutional capacity found to be of particular importance to the success of further alignment of Danish programme procurement:

- The level of integration of Danish programme procurements in the national procurement setup
- Existence of dedicated procurement functions with the necessary procurement expertise
- Availability of operational procurement committees
- Existence of incentives structures underpinning sound procurement

Each of these factors are analysed in more details in the following.

4.1.1 **Integration of programme procurements in the national procurement setup**

The Danish alignment strategy aims to strengthen the procurement capacity in Bangladesh by promoting use of the national procurement system in the Danish sector programme support rather than carrying out programme procurements using parallel structures.

In other words, the Danish alignment strategy does not only imply a gradual transfer from use of Danida procedures to GoB procedures, but also a gradual transfer from carrying out procurements in parallel programme units to carrying out procurements through the institutional procurement setups used by the partner institutions when procuring for national funds.

Today, procurement for Danish programme support in both the agriculture sector and the water/sanitation sector is largely carried out by Danida programme staff in separate programme setups, and with **limited or no integration with the national procurement setup** used by the partner institution for procurements using national funds. For example, the procurements done for the PSU component are all carried out by PSU staff independently from other procurements carried out by the Local Government Division, and the awareness among programme staff of how procurements are carried out in other parts of the Division is limited. The same pattern is valid for most other programme components reviewed by the assessment team.

The limited institutional alignment of Danish programme procurements appears to be closely linked to the weak procurement capacity of the national institutional arrangements in Bangla-
First of all, procurement by government institutions are in many cases not carried out by dedicated procurement units (see also section 4.1.2), as such units are not prescribed by the legal framework. In effect, there is often no obvious place to anchor the Danish supported procurements other than within the programme setup. This challenge is reinforced by the non-existence of a specialised procurement profession, which in practice means that the national procurement setups – even when organised in a centralised procurement unit in the partner institution – are in most cases poorly qualified and overstretched, thus making them ill-equipped to take on more responsibilities.

Another reason for the poor integration between Danish supported programme procurements and other government procurements is that different procedures exist for procurement planning using government funds (i.e. revenue budget) respectively donor funds (i.e. development budget). As such, all procurements carried out as part of a development programme must be based on a specific procurement plan derived directly from the Development Project Proforma (DPP), which in practice leads to a situation where donor supported programme procurements are handled separately by dedicated programme staff. Although this factor formally does not prevent integration between the two types of procurement, the assessment team finds that it contributes to the perception that programme procurements and government procurements are two distinctly different tasks.

4.1.2 Existence of dedicated procurement functions

To ensure that procurements are carried out systematically according to principles of sound and efficient procurement, and in line with the established rules, it is desired that programme procurements are carried out by a dedicated procurement function, whether this be a physical unit or simply an organisationally defined focal point. As programme funded procurements are rarely vested institutionally in the partner institutions (cf. section 4.1.1), the responsibility for appointing a procurement function for the Danish sector programme procurements is left to the management of the individual programme components.

A dedicated procurement function is naturally most important where procurements are of high value, and where high complexity creates a high risk of procedural errors and corruption. Nevertheless, evidence gathered by the assessment team shows that even for smaller procurements of low complexity, deviances from good practice are frequent, thus calling for a general use of professional units or focal points dedicated to handling the procurements of the Danish supported programme procurements.

Currently, dedicated procurement functions rarely exist as part of the programme setups, neither in the form of an organisational unit nor in the form of an appointed focal point. For almost all assessed programme components, procurements are carried out by the specific officer who needs the goods, works, or services in question. In consequence, most staff working with the six programme components assessed have at some point been responsible for executing one or more procurements, but the programme components rarely have any "super users". The only exception from this trend is RRMAC, which has a dedicated procurement officer in place to execute the component’s procurements of works.

As indicated earlier, the general lack of a dedicated procurement function in the programme setups is explained chiefly by the relatively low value and complexity of the procurements carried out by all programme components, which most programme management teams feel do not justify a specialised procurement function internally. Moreover, the option to use a procurement agent has to some extent rendered such as function unnecessary, as the components today still have the freedom to – and do – use Crown Agents strategically to ensure efficiency and value for money, when high values are at stake, when a procurement must be processed quickly, or when high complexity creates a need for more professional handling. From a pragmatic perspective, this division of labour has been a reasonable alternative to a dedicated procurement function up to now. In parallel with the expected phasing out of Crown Agents, however, additional attention must be given to how best to anchor the necessary procurement capacity institutionally in each programme setup.
4.1.3 Existence of procurement committees

The PPA 2006 and the PPR 2008 prescribe the appointment of Tender Opening Committees (TOC) and Tender Evaluation Committees (TEC) for opening respectively evaluation of all tenders submitted under GoB procedures. These two procurement committees together make up a cornerstone in the institutional framework for public procurement in Bangladesh, and are important prerequisites of a fair and transparent procurement system.

Relevant TOCs and TECs are in place and operational for procurements using GoB procedures in almost all programme components reviewed by the assessment team.

The use of committees is frequently associated with minor irregularities. In LGI-CBP, for example, procurement committees are not established ad hoc, but as standing committees responsible for opening and evaluating tenders for several procurements; a practice usually not considered ideal due to the risk of collusion between committee members. In PSU, TOCs and TECs are used correctly, though in addition to these two committees, a standing Procurement Committee has been established to carry out all other tasks associated with the processing of procurements, such as preparation of bidding documents and advertisement.

Most of the irregularities detected in relation to the use of procurement committees appear to be related to a general confusion of GoB procedures with Danida procedures, resulting from the fact that most programme components are familiar with and, from time to time, use both sets of rules (cf. section 2.2). This confusion seems to be a general challenge associated with the current practice of using different procedures for different types of procurements. In this regard, the team notes that both programme management and staff in most components are in favour of phasing out one of the two sets of rules in order to minimise procedural mistakes.

4.1.4 Procurement incentives structures

In Bangladesh, public procurement is a task characterised by limited knowledge, low prestige, and a high potential for misuse. The risk of procurements not being carried out according to sound principles and required standards – with delayed, sub-standard quality, or excessively priced deliverables as a result – is therefore generally high. To counterbalance this risk, a set of incentives structures must be in place to encourage individual compliance and performance.

Given the limited attention given to procurement for the Danish supported programme components, there is also a limited use of individual incentives to encourage procurement performance. The same trend is also reflected on a larger scale in the public sector in Bangladesh, where a procurement profession and a career system for procurement officials has not been established and hence does not offer staff incentives in favour of improved procurement performance.

The assessment team notes that the proximity of procurement decision makers to end-users may, however, in some cases hold the potential to serve as a strong incentive for procurement compliance and performance. This is in particular visible in the case of the HYSAWA Fund, through which UPs may procure tube wells, dug wells, and rain water harvesting systems for their communities. In the UPs, procurement committees are appointed among community members, which are directly affected by delayed or overpriced goods, hereby creating a strong incentive towards sound procurement. In the UP visited by the assessment team, this incentive was clearly illustrated by the fact that the that the committee had used their right to cancel and refloat a tender, as they assessed the price of bids to be higher than the actual market price.
4.2 Leadership

Leadership may be defined as the ability to influence, inspire and motivate people, organizations and systems to achieve their goals. It is also the ability to be open to, to anticipate and respond to change, irrespective of whether this is internally initiated or externally imposed. As such, leadership is a catalyst for achieving, enhancing and sustaining development objectives – in public procurement as well as all other areas.\(^\text{17}\)

This section addresses four aspects of leadership considered to be of particular importance to the success of the Danish alignment strategy in public procurement:

- Visible buy-in from programme management to Danida’s alignment strategy
- Management oversight of procurement processes
- Procurement knowledge enabling management detection of procurement irregularities
- Management follow-up on procurement irregularities

Each of these factors are analysed in more details in the following.

4.2.1 Leadership buy-in to Danida’s alignment strategy

While the Danish decision to gradually align to GoB systems, including in the area of procurement, has been made by the RDE, the responsibility for driving this strategy forward in practice lies with the individual sector programme components. In this process, a visible buy-in from the management teams of the sector programme components to implement Danida’s alignment strategy is pivotal.

In most of the programme components assessed, procurement is largely perceived as a technical and administrative function, i.e. as a means to achieve the defined component objectives. Procurement is considered successful when it effectively provides the goods, works, or services required to produce a given component output, and strengthening of procurement capacities is rarely seen and embraced as a development goal in itself.

As a result of this perception, leadership buy-in to the alignment strategy varies. In particular, there are concerns that the use of GoB rules and procedures will result in delays and higher costs, create a higher potential for political interference, collusive practices and corruption, and eventually impede development results.

All this has resulted in a very heterogeneous situation on the ground. As indicated in section 2.2, some programme components generally apply the GoB procedures when carrying out procurements independently, while in other components, PPR 2008 is seen as an inaccessible, overwhelming document creating delays in programme implementation. In the latter cases, the Danish alignment strategy is often disregarded and replaced by continued use of Danida rules or ‘adaptations’ of PPR 2008.

For example, as a result of a difficult local procurement environment and a low management buy-in to the alignment strategy in TSUN, the use of PPR 2008 was put on hold after the decision of October 2008 to re-open the use of Danida procedures, if the application of PPR 2008 was found to induce disadvantages for the programme implementation. Since then, not further specified procedures have been applied in the component.

By contrast, strong leadership buy-in has played a major role in the successful use of GoB procedures for all procurements carried out by UPs for HYSAWA funds. As such, the HYSAWA Fund Management Office strongly emphasises the importance of leadership for alignment, and contributes actively to creating a receptive environment for alignment by strongly encouraging procurement committees at UP level to enhance their procurement capacities for the common good. This buy-in is further backed by support to local level procurement capacity development, techni-
4.2.2 Management oversight of procurement processes

Public procurement, in Bangladesh and elsewhere, is an area known to be highly prone to mismanagement and corruption. For this reason, critical management oversight of procurement processes is a key task and a necessary prerequisite of efficient and transparent procurement practices. In the context of the Danish sector programme support, the task of overseeing procurement processes should be performed by the Project Director, who must ensure that established policies, rules and procedures are implemented as intended.

The assessment team finds that Project Directors generally do oversee the procurement process. This is done through mandatory approval procedures, such as approval of tender evaluation reports and contract awards. Besides, monitoring of procurement processes, such as the implementation of the procurement plan, is often done jointly by Project Directors and staff in team meetings or steering committee meetings. In PSU, for example, the procurement practices followed for implemented procurements are openly discussed during team meetings where all programme staff participate, hence providing a basis for transparency and oversight beyond the immediate management oversight.

The management oversight role rarely goes beyond mandatory approval role, which in practice leaves a significant scope for procurement mismanagement, and generally leads to a strict focus on compliance with rules and procedures (approval, deadlines) rather than on procurement performance.

One reason for the limited additional oversight appears to be the lack of monitoring tools and techniques. No generic tools enabling Project Directors and other management levels in the public administration in Bangladesh to systematically track procurement performance are currently available, which means that the responsibility to develop such tools is left with the individual public entities and, for the Danish sector programme support, programme components. As procurement is not seen as a strategic task, such tools are rarely developed.

One exception from this trend is the HYSAWA Fund Company, which – as an integrated part of the programme design – has developed a number of procurement monitoring tools, including a Technical Monitoring Checklist and a Quarterly Return Sheet, which must be filled by procurement committees in UPs and submitted to the HYSAWA Fund Management Office at regular intervals for monitoring and follow-up by the Managing Director and the Finance Director.

4.2.3 Procurement knowledge at management level

In order to manage and monitor the procurement process effectively, a certain level of procurement knowledge is imperative. This is also the case in the Danish sector programme support, where the quality of procurements hinges upon the procurement knowledge possessed by the Project Director to detect irregularities in the procurement process.

In most of the programme components assessed, the Project Director is found to have a general knowledge and understanding of the main principles of sound procurement. At the same time, however, it is clear that most Project Directors have a limited knowledge of the GoB procedures specifically and have received little or no training in how to execute their procurement management function or interpret the PPA 2006 and the PPR 2008. In consequence, it is assessed difficult for the Project Directors to detect irregularities in the procurement process.

One obvious reason for this capacity gap is the limited availability of procurement training at the programme management level. Few Project Directors have been offered training on GoB procedures or on how to administer their responsibility to approve procurement processes. At the same time, the assessment team has found very limited evidence that the detection of procurement irregularities is seen as a key management responsibility and actively pursued as such.
4.2.4 Management follow-up on irregularities

Enforcement of public procurement rules is a fundamental ingredient in any effort to ensure a level playing field for the private sector, and to strengthen competition, credibility, and transparency in the procurement process. The existence of a Project Director who follows up on detected irregularities in the procurement process is therefore a critical desired capacity for the Danish sector programme support.

In the six programme components assessed, the experience with follow-up on procurement irregularities is limited. In some components, poor procurement practices or irregularities sometimes lead the Project Director to require one or more steps in the procurement cycle to be redone. For example, in AEC a management decision to change the composition of the TEC was taken upon noticing that the chairman of the TEC and the approving authority was the same person. Similar examples of such ad hoc follow-up are observed in most programme components, though no systematic follow-up appears to be taking place in any of the assessed components.

The limited follow-up is chiefly explained by the factors also presented in section 4.2.3, namely lack of procurement training, and limited focus on detection of procurement irregularities as a key management responsibility.

4.3 Knowledge

Procurement knowledge is a core building block in any procurement capacity development process, and without the right procurement knowledge in the right place, institutional arrangements, leadership, and accountability measures are likely to fail.

This section assesses the level of knowledge available among all staff involved in executing procurement for the Danish sector programme support, with the exception of the programme management level (see section 4.2.3). For this purpose, adequate knowledge has been defined as three distinct desired capacities:

- Knowledge of procurement principles and GoB procedures
- Access to specialist knowledge
- Access to tools and guidelines

Each of these desired capacities are analysed in more details in the next sections.

4.3.1 Knowledge of procurement principles and GoB procedures

To ensure efficient public procurement operations and practices, the level of procurement competence among government officials involved in procurement needs to be consistent with their procurement responsibilities. For the alignment of the Danish sector programme procurements to be successful, personnel involved in procurement must therefore have adequate knowledge about procurement principles in general and GoB procedures specifically.

When analysing the existing knowledge level in public procurement, one has to keep in mind that no established procurement training institutions exist in Bangladesh, and that training in GoB procedures only started in January 2009 and so far targets only four agencies.

This general picture is reflected in the Danida sector programmes, where procurement is in most cases not carried out by qualified procurement specialists but by project staff who is poorly informed about the principles of sound procurement generally, and GoB procedures specifically.

The case reviews carried out by the assessment team thus demonstrate major knowledge deficiencies in drafting of specifications, choosing the correct procurement method, and contract
management. Similarly for evaluation of tenders, the level of knowledge varies across TECs and between committee members.

As mentioned, the poor knowledge of GoB procedures partly relate to the lack of established training institutions and limited availability of training, which explain why in most components, personnel involved in procurement have not received any targeted training on the PPA 2006 and PPR 2008.

Other contributing factors include different aspects of the enabling environment, from the non-existence of a procurement cadre systematically employing procurement professionals in the public sector, to the relatively new and poorly disseminated legislation. Another underlying reason could be the fact that the key management positions of Head of Procuring Entity and Project Director are often vacant and suffer from frequent job rotation, which is a serious barrier to building up strong procurement knowledge in the programme components.

4.3.2 Access to specialist knowledge

Regardless of the whether adequate procurement knowledge exists in the programme components, it is important that personnel involved in procurement have access to specialist knowledge internally or externally. Such specialist knowledge may be used to clarify uncertainties associated with the interpretation of the legal framework, or to provide systematic support at critical stages in the procurement process, including preparation of technical specifications or conducting of technical evaluations.

The findings of the assessment show that several potential access points for expert knowledge exist. Some partner institutions for the Danish programme components for example have specialised procurement units or focal points internally, and externally CPTU would be the institution to involve in case of ad-hoc questions or for general clarifications.

Despite the existence of such internal and external sources of specialist knowledge, the use of these sources is limited for several reasons. Programme components such as the LGI-CBP who have the possibility to consult the procurement unit of its implementing institution (NILG), find that the procurement unit itself often does not have the answer to requests. Similarly, CPTU reportedly do not respond to requests from the programme components. As a result, personnel involved in procurement in practice have limited access to specialist knowledge.

As indicated, a major explanation of the poor access to procurement expertise is that expertise is still severely limited. Departments and organisations that have been assigned the task of providing advice, have not yet managed to build and attract the required knowledge base, and the capacity available in these organisations often far from match existing demands. At the same time, the assessment team observes that programme components often don’t acknowledge their own knowledge gaps, and hence in many cases don’t seek advice.

4.3.3 Availability of tools and guidelines

Given the fact that personnel involved in procurement for the Danish sector programmes often lack the necessary procurement expertise, it becomes pivotal that personnel involved in procurements have access to adequate tools or guidelines that address relevant knowledge gaps.

The only national procurement tools and guidelines published in Bangladesh so far, is the legal and regulatory framework itself, along with a set of standard bidding documents. Moreover, the CPTU website is a main source of procurement information, though limited additional guidelines for the procurement process is published on the website.

Of these ‘guidelines’, especially the PPR 2008 provides a good starting point for officers involved in procurements to be guided through the process. The document contains a number of checklists (e.g. for good procurement record keeping) and flow charts illustrating the various steps in the
procurement cycle according to different types and methods of procurement. However, these are rarely known to the personnel conducting procurements in the Danish programme components.

Similarly, the standard bidding documents developed provide a good guideline for both public officials and bidders in the procurement process, although the fact that the documents are not available in Bangla forms a major barrier to strengthened procurement knowledge, especially at the local government levels.

With the exception of the HYSAWA Fund, no procurement tools or guidelines have been developed by the components. For the HYSAWA Fund, a procurement manual in Bangla for UPs has been developed as a specific project output, as part of the programme component’s explicit aim to strengthen decentralised capacities, including procurement capacities. The manual has been followed systematically and in detail by the UP visited, and is widely considered to be an instructive and necessary tool for procurement.

4.4 Accountability

Accountability allows organisations and systems to monitor, learn, self-regulate and adjust their behaviour in interaction with those whom they are accountable. In public procurement, this is of particular importance, as it provides legitimacy to decision-making, increases transparency, and helps reduce the influence of vested interests.

For the purpose of this assessment, accountability has been defined as three desired capacities:

- Availability of procurement records
- Access to procurement information
- Effective procurement auditing

Each of these desired capacities are analysed in more details in the next sections.

4.4.1 Availability of procurement records

Availability of complete and systematically structured procurement records is the first prerequisite needed to hold public officials, public managers, bidders, and suppliers accountable for the actions in the procurement process. Without procurement records, it is almost impossible to determine whether irregularities have taken place in a given procurement process, or whether procurement performance could have been better.

In all the programme components assessed, some procurement records are available. The quality of procurement record keeping varies, however, greatly across programme components.

In some programme components, procurement case files exist for all procurements, while in others, case files can only be identified for some procurements, or have either disappeared or never been produced.

The files included in the case files in most cases also vary a lot between programme components and within the same programme components. For some case files, almost all records are included, while for others, documentation appears sporadic, and key records, such as the evaluation report, are missing.

Moreover, procurement records for one case are often spread out between several different departments, or left unfiled in stacks wherever there is room for them, thus rendering review difficult.

As the only one, the procurement case file reviewed in the UP visited for the HYSAWA Fund assessment was found to be complete with all records, and readily available for inspection on the spot.
The generally poor record keeping standards are largely explained by lack of knowledge about what constitutes good practice in this area. This is illustrated by the fact that few of the programme components make use of the record keeping checklist provided in the PPR 2008.\footnote{PPR 2008, Schedule VIII, Part B}

At the same time, the assessment team notes that incentives for good record keeping are non-existent, as poor record keeping or unavailability of procurement files is rarely detected let alone sanctioned.

### 4.4.2 Access to procurement information

To function as an effective accountability measure, procurement records must not just be kept according to good record keeping practice, but also be easily and equally be accessed by interested parties, including the public. Though its access, the public can perform their role as 'social auditors', and unsuccessful bidders can determine whether the grounds on which to file a complaint exist.

Generally speaking, the access to procurement information is severely limited in the Danish sector programme components.

In most cases, procurement plans are not published as required by PPR 2008, and monitoring of public institutions is hence almost impossible.

Contract awards are also generally not published, and unsuccessful bidders are usually not notified in writing that the contract has been awarded to a competitor, which makes it difficult for unsuccessful bidders to take action before it is too late. Several of the assessed programme components also indicate that transparency in the evaluation process is constrained by the fact that answers to verbal requests for clarifications are not always shared with all potential bidders at the bidding stage.

As the only type of procurement information, advertisements for open tenders or pre-qualifications are usually published in newspapers and on websites when required.

The limited access to procurement information is largely assessed to have the same root cause as the poor record keeping practices, namely low awareness of requirements in combination with complete absence of sanctions for non-compliance.

### 4.4.3 Effective procurement auditing

Ideally, the framework for auditing or review constitutes the single most important accountability mechanism for public procurement, through which procurement practices are systematically controlled, and audit recommendations are enforced and followed up.

In Bangladesh, it is the responsibility of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to carry out external audits, including audits of the Danish programme components to the extent that GoB systems are applied. The procurements carried out are, however, financial audits which do not address weaknesses in the procurement process in depth. It is the intention that the procurement process will in the long run also be covered by audits, and to prepare external auditors for that, training of auditors on the procurement cycle has been initiated as part of the second phase of the PPRP. At the time of writing, 60-70 external auditors have been trained, with more to follow.

In addition to the audits carried out by CAG, CPTU intends to initiate their own procurement specific audits (post procurement reviews). A tentative framework for these audits is in place, and two to three procuring entities have been recently been exposed to the post procurement review process.
No framework for internal audit does yet exist, and few government entities have in place internal audit units.

In addition to the audits carried out under the national framework, Danida carries out its own value for money audits in its sector programmes in Bangladesh, but the procurement process does not form part of this framework.

Despite the various audit initiatives planned or carried out by the Government of Bangladesh and Danida, few audits are currently targeting the procurement process, despite the high risk associated with this process in Bangladesh. Across the six programme components assessed, the assessment team has thus found no evidence of any audits or reviews carried out on programme procurements. In line with this finding, no valid audit objections regarding procurement have been found according to staff.

To make up for the inadequate existing audit frameworks, a programme specific audit mechanism is at the time of writing being developed by the HYSAWA Fund, though no audits have so far been carried out. Based on this self-invented system, it is the intention that audits will be carried out by the HYSAWA Fund Management Office with support from external consultants and use the developed Technical Monitoring Checklist.

The general lack of a strong auditing framework and auditing capacities poses a most serious threat to the entire procurement system in Bangladesh. This threat is further aggravated by the widespread corruption and political interference permeating the procurement process in Bangladesh.

In the context of the Danish alignment strategy, this absence of effective procurement auditing constitutes a serious risk to the sector programme support, which must be addressed effectively by appropriate Danish risk mitigation measures, if further alignment is to be pursued.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter summarises the main findings of the procurement capacity assessment, and recommends some key steps to be taken to ensure successful continuation of the Danish alignment efforts in Bangladesh.

Following a summary of the assessment findings, a set of short-term recommendations, or quick wins, addressing procurement capacity gaps in the Danish sector programmes are presented. Finally, the chapter provides recommendations for a Procurement Capacity Development Plan addressing more complex capacity gaps in the long term.

5.1 Summary of findings

As presented in chapter 4, the findings of the procurement capacity assessment in the Danish agriculture and water/sanitation sector programme support in Bangladesh points to both capacity strengths and capacity weaknesses.

Among the major capacity strengths identified is the generally high sector programme compliance with the overall requirements for public procurement, including use of the prescribed procurement committees, management oversight performed through mandatory approval processes, and a robust understanding of the main principles of procurement.

Major capacity weaknesses, by contrast, have in particular been identified in the areas of transparency and accountability, where limited procurement monitoring and auditing, poor follow-up on detected irregularities, and non-existence of sanctions for non-compliance poses a serious threat to sound and efficient public procurement.

The assessment shows that capacity strengths and weaknesses cut across the four core issues (institutional arrangement, leadership, knowledge, and accountability), and are in fact often derived from the same root causes, such as absence of a procurement cadre, weak performance incentives structures, and lack of strong audit frameworks.

As a result, the assessment findings also demonstrate that strong procurement capacities at the level of the programme components alone cannot muster the prerequisites needed to ensure a successful alignment process. Adequate procurement capacities in the surrounding framework for public procurement, including in the partner institutions, at government level, and at the RDE, is equally important to success.

The table below summarises the major capacity gaps to be addressed at each of these four levels to adequately underpin further Danish alignment with the public procurement system and procedures of Bangladesh:
### SECTOR PROGRAMMES
- Limited integration with national setup
- Lack of dedicated procurement functions
- Weak leadership incentives and buy-in to alignment strategy
- Lack of strategic procurement oversight
- Poor knowledge of procurement management and GoB procedures
- No tradition for follow-up on irregularities
- Poor record keeping and access to information

### PARTNER INSTITUTIONS
- Lack of dedicated procurement units
- Limited specialist knowledge available
- Lack of sector specific procurement tools and guidelines
- Lack of procurement monitoring tools
- Frequent replacement of Project Directors and Heads of Procurement Entity
- No internal audit units

### DANISH EMBASSY
- Limited integration of alignment strategy in programme designs
- Absence of adequate risk mitigation measures
- Limited collaboration with partner institutions on alignment strategy

### GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH
- No procurement profession
- Weak performance incentives for procurement
- Lack of procurement monitoring framework
- Insufficient procurement advisory services or guidelines
- No established procurement training institutions
- Training on GoB procedures not yet rolled out
- Lack of procurement audit framework

As illustrated by the chart, some of the procurement capacity gaps currently existing in the two sectors assessed can be dealt with quickly and internally by the RDE and the management of the Danish sector programme components. Most of the capacity gaps, however, will require dedication of significant time and resources, and must be led by the Government of Bangladesh with support and buy-in from a broad range of stakeholders, national as well as international.

### 5.2 Short-term recommendations

The findings of the procurement capacity assessment point to a number of short-term recommendations, or quick wins, which can be implemented in the Danish sector programmes to minimise a number of imminent capacity gaps cutting across the individual programme components.

The following quick wins have been identified:

- Appoint a procurement **focal point** for each programme component
- **Disseminate the PPR 2008** to all programme components (including Schedule VIII on record keeping)
- **Disseminate SBDs** to all programme components
- Develop and disseminate **step-by-step guide to the procurement process** to all procurement components
- Organise brief **sensitisation sessions** on the PPR 2008 for selected procurement focal points, accountants, Project Directors, and Technical Advisors (or relevant persons at local government level)
- Ensure existence of **tender boxes and safe deposit** of opened bids

Each of these short-term recommendations, along with the long-term recommendations, will be elaborated and consolidated further in the Procurement Capacity Development Plan, cf. section 5.3.

### 5.3 Next step: Developing a Procurement Capacity Development Plan
To address the capacity gaps identified relating to different core issues and different stakeholders, a Procurement Capacity Development Plan will be drafted based on the findings of this assessment.

The Capacity Development Plan will primarily target the RDE and the Danish sector programme support in the agriculture and water/sanitation sectors, who have requested the Procurement Capacity Development Plan and who have formed the main points of entry for the procurement capacity assessment conducted. Nevertheless, as capacity gaps directly affecting the success of the Danish efforts to align its sector programme support have also been identified elsewhere, the Plan will also address these gaps. This will be done through strategies for enhanced dialogue, planning, and coordination between Denmark, its partner institutions, and key government oversight institutions in Bangladesh, such as CPTU and CAG, along with other like-minded donors and development partners.

To support the Danish alignment efforts in Bangladesh, the Procurement Capacity Development Plan will be structured around two main types of interventions. In line with the Paris Declaration, the Plan will first and foremost encompass a number of procurement capacity development responses aimed at strengthening the institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge, and accountability of public procurement in Bangladesh, hereby contributing to strengthening the sustainable capacity of Bangladesh to develop, implement, and account for its procurement policies. At the same time, and until this capacity has been achieved, the Plan will also include a number of risk mitigation interventions aimed at strengthening the capacity of RDE to apply the safeguards necessary to mitigate the risks associated with use of GoB procedures today.

The Procurement Capacity Development Plan is expected by July 2009.
ANNEX 1
OVERVIEW OF DESIRED PROCUREMENT CAPACITIES

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

- Project procurement is integrated in the broader institutional setup
- Project procurement is executed by an adequately resourced procurement function
- Relevant evaluation and opening committees in line with the PPA/PPR are established and operational
- Incentives structures, including for procurement, encourage individual compliance and performance

LEADERSHIP

- There is a visible buy-in from the project management to implement Danida’s alignment strategy
- The Project Director takes active responsibility for critically overseeing the procurement process
- The Project Director and has the procurement knowledge needed to detect irregularities in the procurement process
- The Project Director follows up on detected irregularities in the procurement process

KNOWLEDGE

- Personnel involved in procurement have adequate knowledge about PPA/PPR
- Personnel involved in procurement have appropriate professional qualifications
- Personnel involved in procurement have access to specialist knowledge internally/externally
- Personnel involved in procurement have access to supporting tools or guidelines that address relevant knowledge gaps

ACCOUNTABILITY

- Procurement records are kept complete
- Procurement information can easily be accessed by all interested parties, including the public
- Procurement practices are systematically controlled through effective audits, and audit recommendations are enforced and followed up
ANNEX 2
LIST OF PEOPLE MET

ROYAL DANISH EMBASSY, DHAKA

1. Mr. Ejnar Hebogaard Jensen, Ambassador
2. Mr. Jan Møller Hansen, Counsellor, Water and Sanitation Sector Programme
3. Mr. Martin Bo Brander, Counsellor, Agriculture Sector Programme
4. Mr. Niaz Chowdhury, Programme Officer, Water and Sanitation Sector Programme
5. Mr. Md. Ashrafuzzaman, Programme Officer, Macro-Economics
6. Ms. Refika Büyükarslan, Head of Finance

AGRICULTURE SECTOR PROGRAMME SUPPORT, PHASE II

Agriculture Extension Component

7. Mr. Ole Sparre Pedersen, Senior Programme Adviser, Programme Support Unit, Planning Commission
8. Mr. Flemming Eriksen, Senior Adviser, Department of Agriculture Extension, Field Services Wing
9. Mr. Hein Bijlmakers, Training and Extension Adviser, Integrated Crop Management, Department of Agriculture Extension
10. Mr. Hasanul Haque (Panna), Project Director, Department of Agriculture Extension
11. Mr. Sayeed Ali, Director General, Department of Agriculture Extension
12. Mr. Salegur Rahman, Deputy Project Director, Department of Agriculture Extension
13. Mr. Nazrul Islam, Assistant Senior Adviser, Department of Agriculture Extension
14. Mr. Tariqul Islam, Administrative Officer, Department of Agriculture Extension
15. Mr. Md. Shahjahan Khashnabish, Accountant, Department of Agriculture Extension
16. Mr. Noor Alam Mallick, Managing Director & CEO, MS International Inc.
17. Mr. Abu Hnif, Partner, Red Hard International
18. Mr. Shah Alam, Partner, Red Hard International

Rural Roads and Market Access Component

19. Mr. John van Rijn, Senior Advisor, Rural Roads & Market Access Infrastructure, Local Govt. Engineering Dept.
22. Mr. P.K. Choudhury, Project Director, Local Govt. Engineering Dept.
29. Mr. Eghanul Huq, Engineer, Rural Roads & Market Access Infrastructure, Local Govt. Engineering Dept.
31. Mr. M. Saifullah, Tender Evaluation Committee (external member), SDE/BWDB
32. Mr. Md. Ehsanul Hoque, Tender Evaluation Committee, UE, Hatia, Local Govt. Engineering Dept.
33. Mr. Md. Aminwe Rosul, Tender Evaluation Committee, UE Subornachar, Local Govt. Engineering Dept.
34. Mr. Imbal Hossain, Tender Evaluation Committee, UE Subornachar, Local Govt. Engineering Dept.
35. Ms. Sakhiya Begum, Labour Contracting Society, Member, Noakhali
36. Ms. Ritona Rani, Labour Contracting Society, Member, Noakhali
40. Mr. Nizamuddin Faroque, Proprietor, M/S Nizamuddin Faroque

**Regional Fisheries & Livestock Development Project (RFLDP), Noakhali Technical Support Unit**

41. Dr. Harvey Demaine, Senior Adviser, Danish Technical Assistance, RFLDP
42. Mr. Md. Abdus Sobhan, Project Director, Department of Livestock Services, RFLDP
43. Mr. Md. Quaiyyum, Deputy Project Director, Department of Fisheries, RFLDP
44. Mr. Md. Shahidullah, Administration & Finance Manager, Danish Technical Assistance, RFLDP
45. Mr. Md. Abdul Mannan, Internal Auditor, Danish Technical Assistance, RFLDP
46. Mr. Syed Mozammel Ali, Administrative Officer, Danish Technical Assistance, RFLDP
47. Mr. Md. Aminul Islam, Accounts Officer, Danish Technical Assistance, RFLDP
WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION SECTOR PROGRAMME SUPPORT, PHASE II

Sector Policy Support Component

48. Mr. Md. Shariful Alam, Project Director (Deputy Secretary), Policy Support Unit, Local Government Division, Ministry of Local government Rural Development & Cooperatives
49. Mr. Poul-Erik Frederiksen, Senior Sector Adviser, Policy Support Unit, Local Government Division, Ministry of Local government Rural Development & Cooperatives
50. Mr. Shams Uddin Ahmed, Deputy Secretary, Policy Support Unit, Local Government Division, Ministry of Local government Rural Development & Cooperatives
51. Mr. Edwin Ranjan Hira, Administration and account manager, Policy Support Unit, Local Government Division, Ministry of Local government Rural Development & Cooperatives
53. Mr. Md. Shajahan Ali, Governance Advisor, Policy Support Unit, Local Government Division, Ministry of Local government Rural Development & Cooperatives

Local Government Institutions Capacity Building Project

54. Mr. Kabir M. Shraf Alam, Director General, NILG, Project Director, Local Government Institutions Capacity Building Project, Local Government Division, Ministry of Local government Rural Development & Cooperatives
55. Mr. Md. Mohsin, Programme Officer, Local Government Institutions Capacity Building Project, Local Government Division, Ministry of Local government Rural Development & Cooperatives

HYSAWA Fund Company

57. Mr. M. Enamul Kabir, Managing Director, HYSAWA Fund Company
58. Mr. S. A. Ahad, Director of Finance, HYSAWA Fund Company
59. Mr. Abdul Khaleque Mia, Chairman, Union Parishad of Baldhara, Singair Sub-district, Manikganj District
60. Mr. Nirjhar Arreng, District / Field Engineer, NGO Forum, Dhaka Region
61. Mr. Habibur Rahman, Co-ordinator, Grameen Sheba Sangstha (Village Welfare Organization)
62. Mr. Rifatul Islam, Senior Program Engineer, NGO Forum

EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS

63. Mr. Amulya Kumar Debnath, Director General, CPTU
64. Mr. Zafrul Islam, Lead Procurement Specialist, World Bank
65. Mr. Tanvir Hossain, Procurement Specialist, World Bank
66. Mr. K.A.M. Morshed, Assistant Country Director, UNDP
67. Mr. A.K.M. Firoz, Procurement Officer, Bangladesh Resident Mission
68. Mr. Brian Forey, First Counsellor, Head of Finance, Contracts & Audit Section, Delegation of the European Commission to Bangladesh
69. Mr. Salahuddin Khan, Senior Programme Officer, Delegation of the European Commission to Bangladesh
70. Mr. Iftekhar Zaman, Executive Director, Transparency International Bangladesh
71. Mr. Tom F. Duff, Contracts Manager, Crown Agents